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RESPONSE TO “SNYDER V. LOUISIANA:
CONTINUING THE HISTORICAL TREND
TOWARDS INCREASED SCRUTINY OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES”
Bidish J. Sarma*†
John P. Bringewatt’s recent note makes several important observations
about the Supreme Court’s opinion in Snyder v. Louisiana.1 Although he
provides reasonable support for the claim that Snyder represents a sea
change in Batson jurisprudence, the US Supreme Court’s fresh opinion in
Thaler v. Haynes2 (rendered on February 22, 2010) reads the Snyder majority opinion narrowly and suggests the possibility that Snyder is not as potent
as it should be. The Haynes per curiam’s guarded reading of Snyder signals
the need for courts to continue to conduct the bird’s-eye cumulative analysis
that the Court performed in Miller-El v. Dretke3 [hereinafter Miller-El II]. If
lawyers challenging discriminatory peremptory strikes and trial courts replicate Snyder’s single-juror approach but ignore concomitant Miller-El
circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination, Snyder may (counterintuitively) sap Miller-El II of its on-the-ground transformative potential. In
other words, lawyers should not rely too much on the “more individualized
focus” observed and applauded by the author because a narrow framing of a
Batson challenge in the Snyder opinion’s image (rather than a wider framing
with a focus on the Miller-El factors) may fail in front of courts that view
Snyder differently than does Bringewatt. A slightly different interpretation
of the historical arc of the relevant cases and a critical reconsideration of
Snyder’s circumstances foreshadow the outcome in Haynes and reveal nuances that suggest problems with Bringewatt’s theory.
Bringewatt correctly describes several landmark decisions in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on race discrimination in jury selection,
including Strauder v. West Virginia,4 Swain v. Alabama,5 and Batson v. Kentucky.6 However, his analysis is incomplete. While he persuasively
*
Bidish Sarma is a staff attorney at the Capital Appeals Project in New Orleans, Louisiana. Allen Snyder is a client of the Capital Appeals Project. The views expressed by the author do
not necessarily represent those of the Capital Appeals Project.
†
Suggested citation: Bidish J. Sarma, Commentary, Response to “Snyder v. Louisiana:
Continuing the Historical Trend Towards Increased Scrutiny of Peremptory Challenges,” 109 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 42 (2010), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/sarma.pdf.
1.

Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008).

2.

Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171 (2010).

3.

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).

4.

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).

5.

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).

6.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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demonstrates that the nature of the judicial inquiry into discrimination has
changed over time, the historical trend has not always been “in favor of
stronger Equal Protection considerations.”7 Rather than charting a neat trajectory, the Court’s decisions reflect staggered progress in an on-and-off
effort to eradicate race discrimination in jury selection. Bringewatt acknowledges that “Hernandez and Purkett seem to disrupt [the] pattern,” but
other cases litter the path as well.8 After Strauder, for example, other Supreme Court cases—including Neal v. Delaware9 and Bush v. Kentucky10—
substantially undercut the progress. These cases presumed state compliance
with the Fourteenth Amendment and ignored the history of discrimination
that preceded the finding that racially exclusionary statutes were unconstitutional. While it is true that the inquiry into discrimination in jury selection
has evolved from a review of blanket statutory exclusions of minorities (in
cases like Strauder) to case-specific intent-based assessments (required by
Batson), the Court has not always made enforcement easier or the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment stronger. The history is a bit more erratic than
Bringewatt presumes.
This history is important because it shows that the Court has sometimes
weakened rather than strengthened mechanisms originally designed to enforce the constitutional mandate. In this context, the question is whether
Snyder really makes it easier for courts to enforce Batson. Although
Bringewatt argues Snyder was “an effort to create a more enforceable standard,” the more individualized focus may actually encumber litigants who
allege that opposing counsel is purposely discriminating against prospective
jurors on the basis of race.11 This perverse effect—that Snyder could work
against those seeking to redress racial discrimination—arises from the
Court’s framing of Snyder and its opinion in Haynes.
Snyder could plausibly be read in either of two ways: as a strong holding
that made “significant change[s] to the standard of review for Batson objections;” or, conversely, as a weak holding—a fact-specific anomaly to be
distinguished away in the vast majority of Batson cases. As a matter of interpretation, Bringewatt persuasively argues that a “remarkable paragraph
. . . alters the Batson standard” because its “conclusion is at odds with the
deference paid by the Court earlier in the opinion to trial judges’ unique
capability to decide Batson issues.” The author is right: the Court’s conclusion would be unsupportable if it truly provided the deference due under a
traditional Batson analysis. If it deferred, the Court would not have stated
that it “cannot presume that the trial court credited the prosecutor’s assertion
that Mr. Brooks [the African American juror] was nervous.” Remarkably,
7. John P. Bringewatt, Note, Snyder v. Louisiana: Continuing the Historical Trend Towards
Increased Scrutiny of Peremptory Challenges, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (2010) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ‘Increased Scrutiny’].
8.

Id. at 1294.

9.

Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).

10.

Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883).

11.

Increased Scrutiny, supra note 7 at 1286.
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the majority was unwilling to acknowledge the significance of this decision
to not credit the claim that Mr. Brooks was nervous. Because Bringewatt
notes that the Court did not “explicitly claim to create a new legal standard,”
the weaker reading seems poised to prevail, even though it is analytically
unconvincing.
But there is good reason to attribute a strong holding to Snyder. On its
face, the case is unprecedented: the Supreme Court overruled the judgments
of a state trial court and supreme court to find a Batson violation where a
single African American juror’s response to a single question sufficed to
render him similarly situated to white jurors who gave similar responses.
This was enough to support a finding of intentional discrimination.12 If Snyder means that a single point of agreement between a black juror and a
white juror combined with a single instance of disparate treatment between
those jurors is sufficient to require a Batson reversal on appeal, it is the most
potent holding in the entire line of jury discrimination cases.
The Snyder holding is paradoxical because the quality that conceivably
makes it potent—that it turned on a single explanation that the Court found
implausible—also makes it distinguishable, and possibly detrimental to
those who seek to rectify racial discrimination in jury selection. Early in the
opinion, the majority skirts the Miller-El cumulative analysis and positions
itself as a one-juror case: “[b]ecause we find that the trial court committed
clear error in overruling petitioner’s Batson objection with respect to Mr.
Brooks, we have no need to consider petitioner’s claim regarding Ms.
Scott.” The opinion also reaffirms the notion that trial court determinations
deserve deference, but then disposes of the trial court’s ruling on the demeanor-based explanation for the strike against juror Brooks. By writing the
opinion in this manner, the Court left open the possibility that lower courts
could distinguish the case away—which is what Bringewatt indicates that
most courts have done.13 The tension between Snyder’s potential force and
its potentially limited application calls into question its precedential value.
As a result, although the Snyder Court “ultimately applied a nondeferential
standard of review,” it also effectively ensured that lower courts would not
follow suit.
On February 22, 2010, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Thaler v.
Haynes that suggests how the highest Court itself views Snyder. Bringewatt
accurately outlines the available options:
It is possible that Snyder means that trial judges must explain the basis for
their decisions on every Batson objection. It is also possible that such an
explanation is only required if the reason proffered by the prosecutor in
support of a peremptory challenge is not supported elsewhere in the re12. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483 (“The implausibility of this explanation is reinforced by the
prosecutor's acceptance of white jurors who disclosed conflicting obligations that appear to have
been at least as serious as Mr. Brooks'.”); id. at 483-85 (comparing juror Brooks’s response to those
given by Roland Laws and John Donnes).
13. See Bringewatt, supra note 7 at 1305-06 (discussing Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853 (8th
Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Prather, 279 F. App’x 761 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam);
United States v. Reed, 277 F. App’x 357 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)).
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cord. Finally, it is possible that the standard only applies under identical
circumstances to Snyder, where one of the prosecutor’s explanations for a
peremptory challenge is not accepted absent an explanation by the trial
judge if another proffered explanation is found to be pretext for raciallymotivated challenges.14

Haynes suggests that the Court will adopt the last view.
Haynes was decided on federal habeas review. The Fifth Circuit determined that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion denying the
defendant Batson relief “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.”15 Therefore, the question
presented to the Supreme Court was limited to whether the relevant federal
law under Batson and Snyder met the high standard of being “clearly established.”
Nonetheless, Haynes strongly hinted that the Supreme Court will read
Snyder to be restrained, not revolutionary. First, the Court stated that Snyder
does not demand that trial judges explain the basis for their rulings on every
explanation offered by the striking party: “Batson plainly did not go further
and hold that a demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the judge
did not observe or cannot recall the juror’s demeanor. Nor did we establish
such a rule in Snyder.” The Court then elaborated:
The part of Snyder on which the Court of Appeals relied concerned a very
different problem. The prosecutor in that case asserted that he had exercised a peremptory challenge for two reasons, one of which was based on
demeanor (i.e., that the juror had appeared to be nervous), and the trial
judge overruled the Batson objection without explanation. We concluded
that the record refuted the explanation that was not based on demeanor
and, in light of the particular circumstances of the case, we held that the
peremptory challenge could not be sustained on the demeanor-based
ground, which might not have figured in the trial judge’s unexplained ruling. Nothing in this analysis supports the blanket rule on which the
decision below appears to rest.”16

The Court’s language speaks for itself, and indicates that, in Bringewatt’s words, “the standard only applies under identical circumstances to
Snyder.”
Snyder’s procedural history and the change in the composition of the
Court contextualize that opinion and may shed light on why the Court embraced a weak reading in Thaler v. Haynes. The Supreme Court remanded
Snyder in light of Miller-El II in June of 2005. Miller-El II was a 6-3 decision, with Justice O’Connor in the majority and Chief Justice Rehnquist
joining the dissent. When Snyder came back to the Supreme Court after the
initial remand, Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts had replaced
O’Connor and Rehnquist, respectively. Even if both Alito and Roberts had
14.

Id. at 1304.

15.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

16.

Id. at 1174-75 (emphasis added).
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preferred to deny Snyder relief, they would have been unable to impact the
outcome, assuming that the five remaining justices from the Miller-El II
majority would grant relief in any case. By joining the majority, Chief Justice Roberts seized the authority to assign the duty to write the opinion.17 He
gave that responsibility to the Justice most likely to write a weak holding—
Justice Alito.18 These circumstances help account for the outcome in Haynes.
The Court’s opinion in Thaler v. Haynes chips away at the claim that
Snyder made Batson more enforceable. It also exposes an important flaw in
Bringewatt’s general theory that a more individualized Batson analysis will
uniformly benefit those who oppose discrimination. Miller-El II helps illustrate the point that a too-individualized analysis can undermine Batson. In
Miller-El II, the Court emphasized the need to consult “all relevant circumstances” of discrimination. Though it didn’t alter Batson’s framework,
Miller-El II left no doubt about what had allowed racial discrimination in
jury selection to continue in the decades since Batson: courts had been conducting too narrow an inquiry. Where courts simply looked at the race
neutrality of the striking party’s explanations and validated them, they failed
to uncover the most significant and damning evidence of discrimination.19
As the Court wrote, “Batson’s individualized focus came with a weakness
of its own owing to its very emphasis on the particular reasons a prosecutor
might give.” By expanding the review—looking at historical evidence, statistical evidence, other evidence of discrimination contained in the record,
and the striking party’s treatment of similarly situated nonminority jurors—
Miller-El II actually moved the jurisprudence a step back from the individualized assessment. In this sense, “increased scrutiny” does not necessarily
entail a more individualized focus. Miller-El II called courts to increase the
level of scrutiny, but that did not mean a mere analysis of one juror at a
time. Instead, it meant considering voir dire as a whole, as well as all other
relevant circumstances that illuminate the striking party’s intent.
Thus, an important consequence of the Snyder’s single-juror approach is
that lower courts may incorrectly read it to narrow the Batson analysis. If
the judicial inquiry into discrimination in jury selection becomes too indi-

17. The Chief Justice has the pivotal power to assign the opinion when he sits in the majority. See, e.g., Paul J. Wahlbeck, Symposium: The Chief Justice and the Institutional Judiciary:
Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1730
(2006) (“The power to assign authorship of the Court’s opinion provides the Chief with the capacity
to direct the Court’s policy-making agenda. This assignment power is unique among the Chief’s
duties in its ability to shape the development of the law.”).
18. Justice Alito’s record as a judge on the Third Circuit indicated that he had not been receptive to defendants’ claims that the prosecution intentionally discriminated against minorities in
jury selection. See, e.g., Riley v. Taylor, 237 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2001), vacated and reh’g en banc
granted, 237 F.3d 348 (3d Cir. 2001), rev’d, 277 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (the initial panel opinion by
Alito denying relief on Batson claim was later reversed by en banc Third Circuit; Alito dissented
from the en banc opinion); Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857 (3d Cir. 1994) (opinion by Alito reversing a federal district court ruling that granted Batson relief).
19. Bringewatt acknowledges this problem when he notes that Purkett v. Elem required a
“low standard for a prosecutor’s explanation.” Bringewatt, supra note 7 at 1294.
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vidualized, courts may overlook highly probative evidence of discrimination. Indeed, Snyder itself failed to even mention that the trial prosecutor
compared the defendant to O.J. Simpson when delivering his argument to
the all-white jury.20 Moreover, courts may fall victim to the bunk notion that
every juror’s uniqueness means that a side-by-side analysis cannot illuminate the striking party’s intent absent perfect symmetry between minority
and nonminority jurors. The Court in Miller-El II noted that requiring “an
exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable.” If courts
looked for perfect or near-perfect symmetry between jurors, they would gut
Batson and ensure that discrimination would run rampant but remain undetected. In short, a hyper-individualized focus could cultivate myopia in
lower courts; litigants must beware, and should proffer as much circumstantial and atmospheric evidence of racism as possible to bolster their claims of
discrimination.
Although Snyder certainly stands out as an important victory for opponents of race discrimination, its long-term effect cannot be foreseen. The
Court’s narrow single-juror approach—which ignores circumstantial evidence of discrimination—and its refusal to require trial courts to rule on
each proffered race-neutral explanation to trigger appellate deference obscure the signals sent. If relied upon, Snyder could trap unwary litigants who
anticipate that lower courts or the Supreme Court will view the case as a
robust pillar against race discrimination. There is no doubt that Bringewatt
was right to state that “[t]he persistence of [race discrimination in jury selection] over time suggests that is has been difficult to find a lasting solution to
the problem.” Snyder very well could be, and should be, a step in the right
direction. Yet, history, context, and Haynes should give pause. Litigants
must remember that Swain’s “net was not entirely consigned to history;”
circumstantial evidence is critical.21 If courts (including the Supreme Court)
continue to distinguish and minimize Snyder, opponents of discrimination
who overlooked persuasive circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent
will curse their misfortune, and regret misreading Batson’s tea leaves.

20. The Court’s failure to discuss the prosecutor’s O.J. Simpson references at trial led one
commentator to criticize the opinion. See, e.g., Camille A. Nelson, Batson, O.J., and Snyder: Lessons from an Intersecting Trilogy, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1722 (2008) (“Oddly . . . the Court . . .
failed to undertake the expansive contextual analysis to which it purportedly subscribes. This was a
tremendous missed opportunity. It is remarkable that the Court in assessing the Batson challenges in
Snyder did not even mention the O.J. Simpson case.”). The failure was especially notable given the
amount of attention the O.J. Simpson references received during oral argument. See Posting of Lyle
Denniston
to
SCOTUSblog,
Commentary:
Trial
judges
on
trial?,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/12/commentary-trial-judges-on-trial/ (Dec. 4, 2007, 2:24pm)
(“The case of Snyder v. Louisiana (06-10119) may live in history as a case about using O.J. Simpson’s legal troubles as a way to ‘play the race card’ before an all-white jury trying a black man. The
Supreme Court, in a hearing on Tuesday, showed some fascination with that part of the case.”).
21.

Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 239

